Docs - monero usage
This commit is contained in:
parent
806c0f0bfc
commit
f4e8e9f216
|
|
@ -1,73 +1,360 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
layout: post
|
||||
title: Monero - best practices for usage
|
||||
subtitle: Each post also has a subtitle
|
||||
title: Monero usage
|
||||
subtitle: From wallets to multisig
|
||||
gh-repo: daattali/beautiful-jekyll
|
||||
gh-badge: [star, fork, follow]
|
||||
tags: [test]
|
||||
tags: [wallet, storage, portals]
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
You can write regular [markdown](http://markdowntutorial.com/) here and Jekyll will automatically convert it to a nice webpage. I strongly encourage you to [take 5 minutes to learn how to write in markdown](http://markdowntutorial.com/) - it'll teach you how to transform regular text into bold/italics/headings/tables/etc.
|
||||
## 4 Monero Usage
|
||||
|
||||
**Here is some bold text**
|
||||
As pointed out in the Chapter 3.3, Monero is one of the cryptocurren-
|
||||
cies that aim to implement as complex anonymity system as possible.
|
||||
Moreover, because of that not only the underlying technology of the
|
||||
network is different from other cryptocurrency projects but the user
|
||||
side as well.
|
||||
|
||||
## Here is a secondary heading
|
||||
### 4.1 Wallets
|
||||
|
||||
Here's a useless table:
|
||||
The essential part of every currency is the user’s ability to access stored
|
||||
funds. In cryptocurrency, this is represented by the wallet and associ-
|
||||
ated software. Overview of the wallet storage methods is described in
|
||||
the Table 4.1.
|
||||
Monero wallet contains information that is necessary to send and
|
||||
receive Monero currency. Each wallet is encrypted by the password set
|
||||
in the creation process. Typical wallet created using Monero software
|
||||
named _example-wallet_ consists of:
|
||||
|
||||
| Number | Next number | Previous number |
|
||||
| :------ |:--- | :--- |
|
||||
| Five | Six | Four |
|
||||
| Ten | Eleven | Nine |
|
||||
| Seven | Eight | Six |
|
||||
| Two | Three | One |
|
||||
- **example-wallet.keys file**
|
||||
**-** Is an encrypted file containing private **spend key** and **view**
|
||||
**key** together with **wallet address**.
|
||||
**-** Keys file also contains user preferences related to transac-
|
||||
tions and wallet creation height, so wallet software will
|
||||
only read blockchain from the wallet creation point.
|
||||
**-** Using this file, the user can restore the wallet by using the
|
||||
monero-wallet-cli command:
|
||||
monero-wallet-cli –generate-from-keys
|
||||
- **example-wallet file**
|
||||
**-** Acts as an encrypted cache for wallet software that contains:
|
||||
∗ List of outputs of transactions that are associated with
|
||||
the wallet, so it does not need to scan the blockchain
|
||||
every time after startup.
|
||||
∗ History of transactions with metadata containing trans-
|
||||
action (TX) keys.
|
||||
|
||||
- **example-wallet.address.txt file**
|
||||
**-** Stores **unencrypted** information containing generated wal-
|
||||
let address.
|
||||
**-** With recent address-based attacks that swap wallet ad-
|
||||
dresses found in clipboard or files on the hard drive for the
|
||||
attacker’s wallet address, this poses a security risk [37].
|
||||
- **Mnemonic seed**
|
||||
**-** Mnemonic seed is a 25-word phrase which the last word is
|
||||
being used as a checksum. Together they represent a 256-bit
|
||||
integer that is the accounts private spend key.
|
||||
**-** By having accounts private spend key, wallet software can
|
||||
derive private view key by hashing private key with Keccak-
|
||||
256. That produces another 256-bit integer that represents
|
||||
private view key.
|
||||
**-** Both public keys are then derived from newly recovered
|
||||
private keys.
|
||||
|
||||
Example of Monero wallet address and mnemonic seed:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Wallet address**
|
||||
**-** 461TWLQhsxrR9dD4CXk4p1RRxAAQ3YCEDhNiGCQjj5
|
||||
QA33ohhZPnCX6346EyEwC7TiRSB3XB8KgNaJ4vThd5N
|
||||
pQqRkGab66
|
||||
- **Mnemonic seed**
|
||||
**-** serving odometer nifty flippant worry sphere were thorn
|
||||
putty bogeys lyrics feast fawns input biscuit hobby outbreak
|
||||
rash tucks dwelt liquid azure inexact isolated liquid
|
||||
|
||||
**4.1.1 Wallet types**
|
||||
|
||||
As Monero wallet can be represented as little as one file or 25 words,
|
||||
it is rather a small piece of information which the user needs to store
|
||||
in the safe place to keep account under own control. To do that, there
|
||||
exist two main types of wallets:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Hot wallet
|
||||
-** Refers to wallet software running on a computer that is
|
||||
connected to the Internet, thus Monero network. By being
|
||||
online, the user can verify incoming transactions, spend
|
||||
from the wallet and check balance as well.
|
||||
**-** As this type of wallet is not air-gapped (not connected to
|
||||
the Internet), this poses an external intrusion risk.
|
||||
**-** The hot wallet can also refer to web-based or exchange-
|
||||
based wallet that is explained further in this Chapter.
|
||||
- **View-only wallet
|
||||
-** Is a wallet containing only private view key pair to see
|
||||
transactions associated with the wallet.
|
||||
**-** As this is a view-only wallet, the user can see incoming
|
||||
transactions but is not able to spend, sign or view outgoing
|
||||
transactions. That results in incorrect balance when the
|
||||
wallet is used for sending funds.
|
||||
- **Cold wallet
|
||||
-** Is an offline solution to storing wallet seed or private keys
|
||||
on storage media. Using method, media storing wallet in-
|
||||
formation have no direct access to the Internet. The storage
|
||||
medium can be represented by an external hard drive, air-
|
||||
gapped computer as well as paper with wallet seed written
|
||||
on it.
|
||||
**-** That comes with increased security from the IT standpoint,
|
||||
but the usability of the cryptocurrency suffers. That is mainly
|
||||
due to the hassle of working with funds when the user
|
||||
wants to spend them as it requires:
|
||||
∗ Cold wallet imported into wallet software in the air-
|
||||
gapped computer.
|
||||
∗ A view-only wallet connected to the Internet.
|
||||
**-** This way, the user can generate an unsigned transaction
|
||||
on the view-only wallet, transfer it for signing to the air-
|
||||
gapped computer and then back to submit transfer to the
|
||||
Monero network.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Exchange hosted wallet
|
||||
-** In the exchange wallet, users funds are stored under an
|
||||
online account in an online exchange.
|
||||
**-** As opposed to a regular wallet, there is no wallet soft-
|
||||
ware or seed required as the whole balance and transaction
|
||||
system is run by the third party. Funds can be controlled
|
||||
through users online account that accessible by traditional
|
||||
username and password.
|
||||
**-** This poses a risk as the third party has complete access to
|
||||
users funds and the account’s security is directly depen-
|
||||
dent on exchanges security measures as Two Factor Au-
|
||||
thentication (2FA) implementation, IP restriction or email
|
||||
verification.
|
||||
- **Web-based wallet
|
||||
-** Web wallet represents server based Monero client that is
|
||||
served to the user in the browser. By using a web wallet, the
|
||||
user can access funds from any Internet-connected device
|
||||
by sharing:
|
||||
∗ Mnemonic seed or private spend and view key to send
|
||||
and receive funds.
|
||||
∗ Public view key and wallet address to view incoming
|
||||
transactions to the wallet.
|
||||
- **Hardware wallet
|
||||
-** Dedicated hardware solution like Ledger Nano S is still in
|
||||
its beta phase [38].
|
||||
**-** Due to lack of real hardware wallet, the community around
|
||||
Monero recommends as the alternative a USB drive with a
|
||||
live distribution of Linux coupled with persistent storage
|
||||
where Monero client and users private key pairs are stored.
|
||||
**-** Although this alternate solution effectively rules out host
|
||||
operating system, there is still a way to capture viable in-
|
||||
formation. Especially when interacting with an untrusted
|
||||
machine, where attacker captures GPU output or uses a
|
||||
hardware keylogger to log the users activity.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
How about a yummy crepe?
|
||||
### 4.1.2 Attacking the wallet
|
||||
With the rapid expansion of cryptocurrencies from 2014 to 2018, this
|
||||
area became a significant spot for malware development [39]. As there
|
||||
are many attack vectors, this Section aims to give info about malicious
|
||||
activities on users wallets.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Here's a code chunk:
|
||||
Wallet thieves
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
var foo = function(x) {
|
||||
return(x + 5);
|
||||
}
|
||||
foo(3)
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
Aim to compromise the system in a way that malware finds wallet
|
||||
files and steals cryptographic keys or seed belonging to the wallet.
|
||||
Although in Monero, keys are encrypted while stored on the disk.
|
||||
When running wallet software, keys can be obtained from memory.
|
||||
This attack can also be performed by distributing malicious wallet
|
||||
client software.
|
||||
|
||||
And here is the same code with syntax highlighting:
|
||||
|
||||
```javascript
|
||||
var foo = function(x) {
|
||||
return(x + 5);
|
||||
}
|
||||
foo(3)
|
||||
```
|
||||
Cloud storage
|
||||
|
||||
And here is the same code yet again but with line numbers:
|
||||
|
||||
{% highlight javascript linenos %}
|
||||
var foo = function(x) {
|
||||
return(x + 5);
|
||||
}
|
||||
foo(3)
|
||||
{% endhighlight %}
|
||||
Cloud storage provides an easy way of sharing files between devices
|
||||
as well as users. As the user does not need to set up the infrastructure
|
||||
and the majority of the services provide free tier, it is usual for people
|
||||
to take this for granted as a safe place to store files [40].
|
||||
This way, the user’s security depends on the following factors:
|
||||
|
||||
## Boxes
|
||||
You can add notification, warning and error boxes like this:
|
||||
- Wallet encryption on the file level, user password habits.
|
||||
- Account security – login implementation, 2FA.
|
||||
- Client application implementation for caching and data transfer.
|
||||
- Vendors storage system security.
|
||||
|
||||
### Notification
|
||||
|
||||
{: .box-note}
|
||||
**Note:** This is a notification box.
|
||||
Delivery chain
|
||||
|
||||
### Warning
|
||||
|
||||
{: .box-warning}
|
||||
**Warning:** This is a warning box.
|
||||
Hardware wallets like Ledger are built to ensure the safety of users
|
||||
coins. Therefore the owner of such a device should be pretty con-
|
||||
fident when using this device that came with original undisrupted
|
||||
packaging.
|
||||
For this attack, malicious vendor puts pre-generated mnemonic
|
||||
seed on a scratchpad. This piece of paper is made to look like an official
|
||||
one-time generated secret key to the wallet for the user. This way when
|
||||
|
||||
### Error
|
||||
|
||||
{: .box-error}
|
||||
**Error:** This is an error box.
|
||||
Malicious seed generation
|
||||
|
||||
Similar to Delivery chain attack, the attacker in this scenario provides
|
||||
service that offers secure seed generation to obtain seed information
|
||||
belonging to the wallet. That is usually done by running a malicious
|
||||
web service that offers secure seed generation for cryptocurrencies or
|
||||
developing a standalone software for download.
|
||||
After the user generates the seed, a package with seed data is
|
||||
automatically sent to the attackers listening service and then saved
|
||||
to the database. Both parties know the private information and can
|
||||
spend funds from the wallet.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.2 Local and remote node
|
||||
|
||||
To spend or view the balance in the wallet, the user is required to have
|
||||
a wallet client software or use third party services to access the Monero
|
||||
network. This Section covers the most common type of accessing the
|
||||
funds, hot wallet in combination with official Monero client software
|
||||
available athttps://getmonero.org/downloads/.
|
||||
Monero client requires to be in synchronization with the network
|
||||
to show the correct balance as well as to work with the funds. That is
|
||||
done by either running a full local node or connecting to the remote
|
||||
node.
|
||||
|
||||
**The node** is a part of the cryptocurrency network that keeps a
|
||||
synced copy of blockchain in the local storage and provides a service
|
||||
that enables clients to access the information from the blockchain file.
|
||||
In Monero client software, this is represented bymonerod, a separate
|
||||
daemon which synchronizes with the network.
|
||||
|
||||
**The local node** is the default option when running wallet soft-
|
||||
ware, using monerod client downloads from Monero network the
|
||||
blockchain and stores it in local storage. As of July 2018, blockchain
|
||||
size is about 44.3 GB. By running local node, client can independently
|
||||
verify transactions as well as blockchain state.
|
||||
|
||||
**The remote node** , on the other hand, represents a lighter ver-
|
||||
sion with slightly less privacy when it comes to working with the
|
||||
wallet. By either choosing in GUI to connect to the remote node
|
||||
or running cli with parameter _.\monero-wallet-cli.exe –daemon-address
|
||||
node.address:port_ , the client connects to the remote node and starts
|
||||
scanning the blockchain as if it was a local one.
|
||||
Comparison of the node types can be found in the Table 4.2.
|
||||
|
||||
**Local node Remote node**
|
||||
Blockchain stored on locally Blockchain stored remotely
|
||||
Observable traffic between
|
||||
nodes
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.3 Multisig implementation
|
||||
|
||||
Monero started to support multisignature transactions and addresses
|
||||
by 17th of December 2017 when codebase for this feature was merged
|
||||
into master by Fluffypony [41]. Multisig became available in the
|
||||
Lithium Luna release that was released 23rd of July 2018 [42].
|
||||
Multisig in a cryptocurrency is a feature that requires the multisig
|
||||
transaction to be signed by all keys that are required. For multisig, one
|
||||
can create a multisig wallet that is designed as follow:
|
||||
|
||||
- 1-of-2
|
||||
**-** Requires one of two participating parties to sign a transac-
|
||||
tion.
|
||||
**-** This scheme acts as a shared wallet where each of the key
|
||||
holders can spend funds without the other party signing
|
||||
the transaction.
|
||||
- 2-of-2
|
||||
**-** Requires both parties to sign a transaction.
|
||||
**-** Each side has to agree to spend funds and sign the transac-
|
||||
tion.
|
||||
- M-of-N
|
||||
**-** Requires M keys of N to sign a transaction, note that M is a
|
||||
subset of N.
|
||||
|
||||
**4.3.1 Multisig usage**
|
||||
|
||||
After Lithium Luna release, only Monero wallet CLI software is ready
|
||||
for processing multisig transactions. In the Figures 4.2 and 4.3 example
|
||||
scheme of 2-of-2 is presented with user A as blue and user B as green
|
||||
for wallet generation and transaction using Monero multisig feature.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.4 Problems in Monero environment
|
||||
|
||||
Monero privacy features are appreciated not only by privacy savvy
|
||||
users but malware, phishing, and other malicious software creators
|
||||
as well.
|
||||
The main reason to use Monero over other cryptocurrencies for
|
||||
them is that Monero is not only harder to trace but when the attack is
|
||||
implemented well, after moving funds in separate batches to multiple
|
||||
wallets an over more extended period, no one will be able to associate
|
||||
the coins with the malicious activity.
|
||||
There are four main problems concerning Monero environment:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
1) Ransomware
|
||||
|
||||
Malware that encrypts user files and then demands a ransom in the
|
||||
form of cryptocurrency, computer and files are no longer accessible
|
||||
unless the user pays the required amount. During its peak time, all
|
||||
popular ransomware demanded payment in Bitcoin.
|
||||
As malware developers started to get their coins targeted by projects
|
||||
such as one from Netherlands’ police called No More Ransom available
|
||||
atnomoreransom.org[43, 44]. Because of this targeting, they had to
|
||||
choose another cryptocurrency to solve this problem, and the solu-
|
||||
tion was Monero [45]. Kirk is an example of Monero malware that is
|
||||
included in the Figure 4.5 [46].
|
||||
|
||||
Figure 4.4: Kirk ransomware that demands payment in Monero.
|
||||
|
||||
2) Scam portals
|
||||
|
||||
As mentioned in the Section Wallets 4.1, online wallets usage is a risky
|
||||
thing due to entrusting user’s private keys to the third party. Users
|
||||
often choose them as they are not required to have any additional
|
||||
software. Due to this fact, there are more than ten domains that copy
|
||||
the design, functionality, and name ofmymonero.comofficial online
|
||||
wallet with added code that steals the user’s wallet data. Detailed list
|
||||
of domains is available at https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/wiki
|
||||
/avoid.
|
||||
Aside from direct scams, there are also services offering wallet
|
||||
services which have their codebase closed and store all wallet infor-
|
||||
mation. The best-known example of such service is freewallet.org,
|
||||
that is strongly criticized for closed source as well as funds that are
|
||||
reported as missing from user’s accounts [47].
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
3) Crypto-jacking attack
|
||||
|
||||
Crypto-jacking a type of attack where the attacker delivers a malicious
|
||||
payload to the user’s computer. Rather than rendering the device
|
||||
unusable either by blocking like ransomware, part of system resources
|
||||
is used for mining.
|
||||
|
||||
Figure 4.5: Some websites openly state that they mine Monero.
|
||||
|
||||
Crypto-jacking is becoming more frequent than ransomware as it
|
||||
has proven that steady but low income is more profitable than one-
|
||||
time payment in the form of ransomware [48].
|
||||
|
||||
4) Black Ruby
|
||||
|
||||
Interesting intersection of ransomware and crypto-jacking category is
|
||||
Black Ruby malware that combines features of both. First, it encrypts
|
||||
files on the target computer and then proceeds to mine Monero using
|
||||
XMRig (as explained in the Section 7.2) at full CPU load [49].
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.5 Monero use case
|
||||
|
||||
Aside from code quality and features, another important factor in
|
||||
cryptocurrency success are the ways how users can spend the funds.
|
||||
While numerous community around Monero that centers around
|
||||
Reddit _/r/Monero_ created _/r/XMRtrader_ , there are also projects that
|
||||
support Monero in day-to-day use like https://xmr.to/.
|
||||
What is most noticeable tough, are darknet markets, that started
|
||||
to support payments by Monero. This results in the rather negative
|
||||
use case of the crypto as payments by Monero are not directly likable
|
||||
to one’s wallet as described in the Section 3.5.2.
|
||||
|
||||
Although darknet markets may support Monero, a short inspection
|
||||
of Top 10 markets revealed that only 5 of them list Monero as the
|
||||
general way to pay. Rest of them are not forcing the sellers to use
|
||||
Monero. This results at about 40% availability of Monero payment
|
||||
option on these type of markets.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue