mirror of
https://github.com/CloverHackyColor/CloverBootloader.git
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366 lines
11 KiB
C
366 lines
11 KiB
C
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/** @file
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AMD Sev Dxe driver. This driver is dispatched early in DXE, due to being list
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in APRIORI. It clears C-bit from MMIO and NonExistent Memory space when SEV
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is enabled.
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Copyright (c) 2017 - 2020, AMD Inc. All rights reserved.<BR>
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SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
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**/
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#include <IndustryStandard/Q35MchIch9.h>
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#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
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#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
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#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
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#include <Library/DxeServicesTableLib.h>
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#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
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#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
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#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
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#include <Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h>
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#include <Library/PcdLib.h>
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#include <Pi/PrePiDxeCis.h>
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#include <Protocol/SevMemoryAcceptance.h>
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#include <Protocol/MemoryAccept.h>
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#include <Uefi/UefiSpec.h>
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// Present, initialized, tested bits defined in MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.h
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#define EFI_MEMORY_INTERNAL_MASK 0x0700000000000000ULL
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STATIC
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EFI_STATUS
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AllocateConfidentialComputingBlob (
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OUT CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION **CcBlobPtr
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)
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{
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EFI_STATUS Status;
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CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION *CcBlob;
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Status = gBS->AllocatePool (
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EfiACPIReclaimMemory,
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sizeof (CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION),
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(VOID **)&CcBlob
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);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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return Status;
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}
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CcBlob->Header = SIGNATURE_32 ('A', 'M', 'D', 'E');
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CcBlob->Version = 1;
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CcBlob->Reserved = 0;
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CcBlob->SecretsPhysicalAddress = (UINT64)(UINTN)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase);
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CcBlob->SecretsSize = FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize);
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CcBlob->Reserved1 = 0;
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CcBlob->CpuidPhysicalAddress = (UINT64)(UINTN)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidBase);
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CcBlob->CpuidLSize = FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidSize);
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CcBlob->Reserved2 = 0;
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*CcBlobPtr = CcBlob;
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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STATIC EFI_HANDLE mAmdSevDxeHandle = NULL;
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STATIC BOOLEAN mAcceptAllMemoryAtEBS = TRUE;
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STATIC EFI_EVENT mAcceptAllMemoryEvent = NULL;
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STATIC
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EFI_STATUS
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EFIAPI
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AmdSevMemoryAccept (
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IN EDKII_MEMORY_ACCEPT_PROTOCOL *This,
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IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS StartAddress,
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IN UINTN Size
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)
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{
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//
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// The StartAddress must be page-aligned, and the Size must be a positive
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// multiple of SIZE_4KB. Use an assert instead of returning an erros since
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// this is an EDK2-internal protocol.
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//
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ASSERT (IS_ALIGNED (StartAddress, SIZE_4KB));
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ASSERT (IS_ALIGNED (Size, SIZE_4KB));
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ASSERT (Size != 0);
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MemEncryptSevSnpPreValidateSystemRam (
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StartAddress,
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EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (Size)
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);
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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STATIC
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EFI_STATUS
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AcceptAllMemory (
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VOID
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)
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{
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EFI_GCD_MEMORY_SPACE_DESCRIPTOR *AllDescMap;
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UINTN NumEntries;
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UINTN Index;
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EFI_STATUS Status;
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DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Accepting all memory\n"));
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/*
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* Get a copy of the memory space map to iterate over while
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* changing the map.
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*/
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Status = gDS->GetMemorySpaceMap (&NumEntries, &AllDescMap);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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return Status;
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}
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for (Index = 0; Index < NumEntries; Index++) {
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CONST EFI_GCD_MEMORY_SPACE_DESCRIPTOR *Desc;
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Desc = &AllDescMap[Index];
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if (Desc->GcdMemoryType != EFI_GCD_MEMORY_TYPE_UNACCEPTED) {
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continue;
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}
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Status = AmdSevMemoryAccept (
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NULL,
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Desc->BaseAddress,
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Desc->Length
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);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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break;
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}
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Status = gDS->RemoveMemorySpace (Desc->BaseAddress, Desc->Length);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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break;
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}
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Status = gDS->AddMemorySpace (
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EfiGcdMemoryTypeSystemMemory,
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Desc->BaseAddress,
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Desc->Length,
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// Allocable system memory resource capabilities as masked
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// in MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Page.c:PromoteMemoryResource
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Desc->Capabilities & ~(EFI_MEMORY_INTERNAL_MASK | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME)
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);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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break;
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}
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}
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gBS->FreePool (AllDescMap);
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gBS->CloseEvent (mAcceptAllMemoryEvent);
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return Status;
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}
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VOID
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EFIAPI
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ResolveUnacceptedMemory (
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IN EFI_EVENT Event,
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IN VOID *Context
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)
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{
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EFI_STATUS Status;
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if (!mAcceptAllMemoryAtEBS) {
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return;
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}
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Status = AcceptAllMemory ();
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ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
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}
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STATIC
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EFI_STATUS
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EFIAPI
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AllowUnacceptedMemory (
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IN OVMF_SEV_MEMORY_ACCEPTANCE_PROTOCOL *This
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)
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{
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mAcceptAllMemoryAtEBS = FALSE;
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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STATIC
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OVMF_SEV_MEMORY_ACCEPTANCE_PROTOCOL
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mMemoryAcceptanceProtocol = { AllowUnacceptedMemory };
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STATIC EDKII_MEMORY_ACCEPT_PROTOCOL mMemoryAcceptProtocol = {
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AmdSevMemoryAccept
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};
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EFI_STATUS
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EFIAPI
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AmdSevDxeEntryPoint (
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IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
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IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
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)
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{
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EFI_STATUS Status;
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EFI_GCD_MEMORY_SPACE_DESCRIPTOR *AllDescMap;
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UINTN NumEntries;
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UINTN Index;
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CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION *SnpBootDxeTable;
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//
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// Do nothing when SEV is not enabled
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//
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if (!MemEncryptSevIsEnabled ()) {
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return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
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}
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//
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// Iterate through the GCD map and clear the C-bit from MMIO and NonExistent
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// memory space. The NonExistent memory space will be used for mapping the
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// MMIO space added later (eg PciRootBridge). By clearing both known MMIO and
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// NonExistent memory space can gurantee that current and furture MMIO adds
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// will have C-bit cleared.
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//
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Status = gDS->GetMemorySpaceMap (&NumEntries, &AllDescMap);
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if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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for (Index = 0; Index < NumEntries; Index++) {
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CONST EFI_GCD_MEMORY_SPACE_DESCRIPTOR *Desc;
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Desc = &AllDescMap[Index];
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if ((Desc->GcdMemoryType == EfiGcdMemoryTypeMemoryMappedIo) ||
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(Desc->GcdMemoryType == EfiGcdMemoryTypeNonExistent))
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{
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Status = MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask (
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0,
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Desc->BaseAddress,
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EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (Desc->Length)
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);
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ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
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}
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}
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FreePool (AllDescMap);
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}
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//
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// If PCI Express is enabled, the MMCONFIG area has been reserved, rather
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// than marked as MMIO, and so the C-bit won't be cleared by the above walk
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// through the GCD map. Check for the MMCONFIG area and clear the C-bit for
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// the range.
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//
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if (PcdGet16 (PcdOvmfHostBridgePciDevId) == INTEL_Q35_MCH_DEVICE_ID) {
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Status = MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask (
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0,
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FixedPcdGet64 (PcdPciExpressBaseAddress),
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EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (SIZE_256MB)
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);
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ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
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}
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//
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// When SMM is enabled, clear the C-bit from SMM Saved State Area
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//
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// NOTES: The SavedStateArea address cleared here is before SMBASE
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// relocation. Currently, we do not clear the SavedStateArea address after
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// SMBASE is relocated due to the following reasons:
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//
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// 1) Guest BIOS never access the relocated SavedStateArea.
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//
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// 2) The C-bit works on page-aligned address, but the SavedStateArea
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// address is not a page-aligned. Theoretically, we could roundup the address
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// and clear the C-bit of aligned address but looking carefully we found
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// that some portion of the page contains code -- which will causes a bigger
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// issues for SEV guest. When SEV is enabled, all the code must be encrypted
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// otherwise hardware will cause trap.
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//
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// We restore the C-bit for this SMM Saved State Area after SMBASE relocation
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// is completed (See OvmfPkg/Library/SmmCpuFeaturesLib/SmmCpuFeaturesLib.c).
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//
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if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdSmmSmramRequire)) {
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UINTN MapPagesBase;
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UINTN MapPagesCount;
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Status = MemEncryptSevLocateInitialSmramSaveStateMapPages (
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&MapPagesBase,
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&MapPagesCount
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);
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ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
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//
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// Although these pages were set aside (i.e., allocated) by PlatformPei, we
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// could be after a warm reboot from the OS. Don't leak any stale OS data
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// to the hypervisor.
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//
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ZeroMem ((VOID *)MapPagesBase, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (MapPagesCount));
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Status = MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask (
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0, // Cr3BaseAddress -- use current CR3
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MapPagesBase, // BaseAddress
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MapPagesCount // NumPages
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);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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DEBUG ((
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DEBUG_ERROR,
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"%a: MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask(): %r\n",
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__func__,
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Status
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));
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ASSERT (FALSE);
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CpuDeadLoop ();
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}
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}
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Status = AllocateConfidentialComputingBlob (&SnpBootDxeTable);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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DEBUG ((
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DEBUG_ERROR,
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"%a: AllocateConfidentialComputingBlob(): %r\n",
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__func__,
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Status
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));
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ASSERT (FALSE);
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CpuDeadLoop ();
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}
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if (MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
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//
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// Memory acceptance began being required in SEV-SNP, so install the
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// memory accept protocol implementation for a SEV-SNP active guest.
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//
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Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
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&mAmdSevDxeHandle,
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&gEdkiiMemoryAcceptProtocolGuid,
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&mMemoryAcceptProtocol,
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&gOvmfSevMemoryAcceptanceProtocolGuid,
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&mMemoryAcceptanceProtocol,
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NULL
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);
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ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
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// SEV-SNP support does not automatically imply unaccepted memory support,
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// so make ExitBootServices accept all unaccepted memory if support is
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// not communicated.
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Status = gBS->CreateEventEx (
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EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL,
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TPL_CALLBACK,
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ResolveUnacceptedMemory,
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NULL,
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&gEfiEventBeforeExitBootServicesGuid,
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&mAcceptAllMemoryEvent
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);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "AllowUnacceptedMemory event creation for EventBeforeExitBootServices failed.\n"));
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}
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//
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// If its SEV-SNP active guest then install the CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SEV_SNP_BLOB.
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// It contains the location for both the Secrets and CPUID page.
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//
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return gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (
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&gConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlobGuid,
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SnpBootDxeTable
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);
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}
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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