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102 lines
5.5 KiB
C
102 lines
5.5 KiB
C
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/** @file
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Security2 Architectural Protocol as defined in PI Specification1.2.1 VOLUME 2 DXE
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Abstracts security-specific functions from the DXE Foundation of UEFI Image Verification,
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Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, and User Identity policy for image loading and
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consoles. This protocol must be produced by a boot service or runtime DXE driver.
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This protocol is optional and must be published prior to the EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL.
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As a result, the same driver must publish both of these interfaces.
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When both Security and Security2 Architectural Protocols are published, LoadImage must use
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them in accordance with the following rules:
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The Security2 protocol must be used on every image being loaded.
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The Security protocol must be used after the Securiy2 protocol and only on images that
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have been read using Firmware Volume protocol.
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When only Security architectural protocol is published, LoadImage must use it on every image
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being loaded.
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Copyright (c) 2012 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
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SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
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**/
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#ifndef __ARCH_PROTOCOL_SECURITY2_H__
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#define __ARCH_PROTOCOL_SECURITY2_H__
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///
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/// Global ID for the Security2 Code Architectural Protocol
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///
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#define EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL_GUID \
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{ 0x94ab2f58, 0x1438, 0x4ef1, {0x91, 0x52, 0x18, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x3a, 0x0e, 0x68 } }
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typedef struct _EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL;
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/**
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The DXE Foundation uses this service to measure and/or verify a UEFI image.
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This service abstracts the invocation of Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, UEFI
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Secure boot, and UEFI User Identity infrastructure. For the former two, the DXE Foundation
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invokes the FileAuthentication() with a DevicePath and corresponding image in
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FileBuffer memory. The TCG measurement code will record the FileBuffer contents into the
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appropriate PCR. The image verification logic will confirm the integrity and provenance of the
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image in FileBuffer of length FileSize . The origin of the image will be DevicePath in
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these cases.
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If the FileBuffer is NULL, the interface will determine if the DevicePath can be connected
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in order to support the User Identification policy.
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@param This The EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL instance.
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@param File A pointer to the device path of the file that is
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being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
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@param FileBuffer A pointer to the buffer with the UEFI file image.
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@param FileSize The size of the file.
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@param BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service. If
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FileAuthentication() is invoked not from the LoadImage(),
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BootPolicy must be set to FALSE.
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@retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL
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FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates
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that the DXE Foundation may use the file.
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@retval EFI_SUCCESS The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath
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and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform
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policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in
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FileBuffer.
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@retval EFI_SUCCESS FileBuffer is NULL and current user has permission to start
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UEFI device drivers on the device path specified by DevicePath.
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@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by DevicePath and FileBuffer did not
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authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the file should be
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placed in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file
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execution table.
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@retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not
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authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE
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Foundation may not use File.
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@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION FileBuffer is NULL and the user has no
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permission to start UEFI device drivers on the device path specified
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by DevicePath.
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@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION FileBuffer is not NULL and the user has no permission to load
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drivers from the device path specified by DevicePath. The
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image has been added into the list of the deferred images.
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**/
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typedef EFI_STATUS (EFIAPI *EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION) (
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IN CONST EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL *This,
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IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath,
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IN VOID *FileBuffer,
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IN UINTN FileSize,
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IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
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);
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///
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/// The EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL is used to abstract platform-specific policy from the
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/// DXE Foundation. This includes measuring the PE/COFF image prior to invoking, comparing the
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/// image against a policy (whether a white-list/black-list of public image verification keys
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/// or registered hashes).
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///
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struct _EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL {
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EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION FileAuthentication;
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};
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extern EFI_GUID gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid;
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#endif
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