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https://github.com/CloverHackyColor/CloverBootloader.git
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105 lines
2.8 KiB
C
105 lines
2.8 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* This implemments a dummy key manager for legacy KDFs that still support the
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* old way of performing a KDF via EVP_PKEY_derive(). New KDFs should not be
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* implemented this way. In reality there is no key data for such KDFs, so this
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* key manager does very little.
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*/
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#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include "prov/implementations.h"
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#include "prov/providercommon.h"
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#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
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#include "prov/kdfexchange.h"
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static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_new_fn kdf_newdata;
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static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_free_fn kdf_freedata;
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static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_has_fn kdf_has;
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KDF_DATA *ossl_kdf_data_new(void *provctx)
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{
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KDF_DATA *kdfdata;
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if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
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return NULL;
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kdfdata = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kdfdata));
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if (kdfdata == NULL)
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return NULL;
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kdfdata->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
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if (kdfdata->lock == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_free(kdfdata);
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return NULL;
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}
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kdfdata->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx);
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kdfdata->refcnt = 1;
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return kdfdata;
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}
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void ossl_kdf_data_free(KDF_DATA *kdfdata)
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{
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int ref = 0;
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if (kdfdata == NULL)
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return;
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CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&kdfdata->refcnt, &ref, kdfdata->lock);
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if (ref > 0)
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return;
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CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(kdfdata->lock);
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OPENSSL_free(kdfdata);
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}
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int ossl_kdf_data_up_ref(KDF_DATA *kdfdata)
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{
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int ref = 0;
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/* This is effectively doing a new operation on the KDF_DATA and should be
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* adequately guarded again modules' error states. However, both current
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* calls here are guarded propery in exchange/kdf_exch.c. Thus, it
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* could be removed here. The concern is that something in the future
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* might call this function without adequate guards. It's a cheap call,
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* it seems best to leave it even though it is currently redundant.
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*/
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if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
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return 0;
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CRYPTO_UP_REF(&kdfdata->refcnt, &ref, kdfdata->lock);
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return 1;
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}
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static void *kdf_newdata(void *provctx)
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{
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return ossl_kdf_data_new(provctx);
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}
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static void kdf_freedata(void *kdfdata)
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{
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ossl_kdf_data_free(kdfdata);
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}
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static int kdf_has(const void *keydata, int selection)
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{
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return 1; /* nothing is missing */
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}
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const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_keymgmt_functions[] = {
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_NEW, (void (*)(void))kdf_newdata },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_FREE, (void (*)(void))kdf_freedata },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_HAS, (void (*)(void))kdf_has },
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{ 0, NULL }
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};
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