mirror of
https://github.com/CloverHackyColor/CloverBootloader.git
synced 2024-12-05 13:33:33 +01:00
7c0aa811ec
Signed-off-by: Sergey Isakov <isakov-sl@bk.ru>
2217 lines
52 KiB
C
2217 lines
52 KiB
C
/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
|
|
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* This package is an SSL implementation written
|
|
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
|
|
*
|
|
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
|
|
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
|
|
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
|
|
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
|
|
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
|
|
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
*
|
|
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
|
|
* the code are not to be removed.
|
|
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
|
|
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
|
|
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
|
|
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
* are met:
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
|
* must display the following acknowledgement:
|
|
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
|
|
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
|
|
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
|
|
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
|
|
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
|
|
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
|
|
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
|
|
*
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
*
|
|
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
|
|
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
|
|
* copied and put under another distribution licence
|
|
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
#include <time.h>
|
|
#include <errno.h>
|
|
|
|
#include "cryptlib.h"
|
|
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/x509.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/objects.h>
|
|
|
|
/* CRL score values */
|
|
|
|
/* No unhandled critical extensions */
|
|
|
|
#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
|
|
|
|
/* certificate is within CRL scope */
|
|
|
|
#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
|
|
|
|
/* CRL times valid */
|
|
|
|
#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
|
|
|
|
/* Issuer name matches certificate */
|
|
|
|
#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
|
|
|
|
/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
|
|
|
|
#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
|
|
|
|
/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
|
|
|
|
#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
|
|
|
|
/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
|
|
|
|
#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
|
|
|
|
/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
|
|
|
|
#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
|
|
|
|
/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
|
|
|
|
#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
|
|
|
|
static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
|
|
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
|
|
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
|
|
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
|
|
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
|
|
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
|
|
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
|
|
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
|
|
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
|
|
|
|
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
|
|
unsigned int *preasons,
|
|
X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
|
|
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
|
|
X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
|
|
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
|
|
X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
|
|
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
|
|
X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
|
|
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
|
|
unsigned int *preasons);
|
|
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
|
|
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
|
|
|
|
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
|
|
const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
|
|
{
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
|
|
int bad_chain = 0;
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
|
|
int depth,i,ok=0;
|
|
int num;
|
|
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
|
|
if (ctx->cert == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
|
|
|
|
/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
|
|
* present and that the first entry is in place */
|
|
if (ctx->chain == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
|
|
(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
|
|
{
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
|
ctx->last_untrusted=1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
|
|
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
|
|
&& (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
|
|
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
|
|
depth=param->depth;
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (;;)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If we have enough, we break */
|
|
if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
|
|
* note of it and, if appropriate, use the
|
|
* X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
|
|
* code later.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* If we are self signed, we break */
|
|
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
|
|
|
|
/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
|
|
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
|
|
if (xtmp != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
|
|
{
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
|
(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
|
|
ctx->last_untrusted++;
|
|
x=xtmp;
|
|
num++;
|
|
/* reparse the full chain for
|
|
* the next one */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
|
|
* certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
|
|
* if possible, otherwise we complain. */
|
|
|
|
/* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
|
|
* is self signed.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
|
|
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
|
|
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
|
|
{
|
|
/* we have a self signed certificate */
|
|
if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
|
|
{
|
|
/* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
|
|
* we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
|
|
* match to avoid possible impersonation.
|
|
*/
|
|
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
|
|
if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
|
|
ctx->current_cert=x;
|
|
ctx->error_depth=i-1;
|
|
if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
|
|
bad_chain = 1;
|
|
ok=cb(0,ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
|
|
* so we get any trust settings.
|
|
*/
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
x = xtmp;
|
|
(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
|
|
ctx->last_untrusted=0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
|
|
chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
|
|
ctx->last_untrusted--;
|
|
num--;
|
|
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
|
|
for (;;)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If we have enough, we break */
|
|
if (depth < num) break;
|
|
|
|
/* If we are self signed, we break */
|
|
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
|
|
|
|
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
|
|
|
|
if (ok < 0) return ok;
|
|
if (ok == 0) break;
|
|
|
|
x = xtmp;
|
|
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
|
|
{
|
|
X509_free(xtmp);
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
num++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
|
|
|
|
/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
|
|
if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
|
|
{
|
|
if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
|
|
{
|
|
if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
|
|
ctx->current_cert=x;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
|
|
num++;
|
|
ctx->last_untrusted=num;
|
|
ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
|
|
chain_ss=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->error_depth=num-1;
|
|
bad_chain = 1;
|
|
ok=cb(0,ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
|
|
ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
/* Check name constraints */
|
|
|
|
ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
/* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
|
|
|
|
if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
|
|
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
|
|
|
|
/* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
|
|
* because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
|
|
if(!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
|
|
if (ctx->verify != NULL)
|
|
ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
|
|
else
|
|
ok=internal_verify(ctx);
|
|
if(!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
|
|
/* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
|
|
ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* If we get this far evaluate policies */
|
|
if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
|
|
ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
|
|
if(!ok) goto end;
|
|
if (0)
|
|
{
|
|
end:
|
|
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
|
|
}
|
|
if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
|
|
if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
X509 *issuer;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
|
|
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
|
|
return issuer;
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
|
|
|
|
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
|
|
if (ret == X509_V_OK)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
/* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
|
|
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = ret;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
|
|
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
|
|
|
|
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
|
|
if (*issuer)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
|
|
* with the supplied purpose
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#else
|
|
int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
|
|
int proxy_path_length = 0;
|
|
int purpose;
|
|
int allow_proxy_certs;
|
|
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
|
|
|
|
/* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
|
|
-1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
|
|
use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
|
|
0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
|
|
used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
|
|
1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
|
|
all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
|
|
*/
|
|
must_be_ca = -1;
|
|
|
|
/* CRL path validation */
|
|
if (ctx->parent)
|
|
{
|
|
allow_proxy_certs = 0;
|
|
purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
allow_proxy_certs =
|
|
!!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
|
|
/* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
|
|
software happy */
|
|
if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
|
|
allow_proxy_certs = 1;
|
|
purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check all untrusted certificates */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
|
|
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
|
|
&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ok=cb(0,ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ok=cb(0,ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = X509_check_ca(x);
|
|
switch(must_be_ca)
|
|
{
|
|
case -1:
|
|
if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
|
|
&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
|
|
{
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0:
|
|
if (ret != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
if ((ret == 0)
|
|
|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
|
|
&& (ret != 1)))
|
|
{
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ok=cb(0,ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
|
|
if ((ret == 0)
|
|
|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
|
|
&& (ret != 1)))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ok=cb(0,ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check pathlen if not self issued */
|
|
if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
|
|
&& (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
|
|
&& (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ok=cb(0,ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Increment path length if not self issued */
|
|
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
|
|
plen++;
|
|
/* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
|
|
certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
|
|
certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
|
|
CA certificate. */
|
|
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
|
|
{
|
|
if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error =
|
|
X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ok=cb(0,ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
proxy_path_length++;
|
|
must_be_ca = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
must_be_ca = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
end:
|
|
return ok;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
int i, j, rv;
|
|
/* Check name constraints for all certificates */
|
|
for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
|
|
{
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
|
|
/* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
|
|
if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
|
|
continue;
|
|
/* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
|
|
* chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
|
|
* speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
|
|
* assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
|
|
{
|
|
NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
|
|
if (nc)
|
|
{
|
|
rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
|
|
if (rv != X509_V_OK)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error = rv;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
|
|
return 1;
|
|
#else
|
|
int i, ok;
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
|
|
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
|
|
/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
|
|
i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
|
|
ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
|
|
if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
|
|
ok = cb(0, ctx);
|
|
return ok;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, last, ok;
|
|
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
|
|
last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
|
|
if (ctx->parent)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
last = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
ok = check_cert(ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
int ok, cnum;
|
|
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
|
|
ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
|
|
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
|
|
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
|
|
if (ctx->get_crl)
|
|
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
|
|
else
|
|
ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
|
|
/* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
|
|
* notify callback
|
|
*/
|
|
if(!ok)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ctx->current_crl = crl;
|
|
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (dcrl)
|
|
{
|
|
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
|
|
if (ok != 2)
|
|
{
|
|
ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_CRL_free(crl);
|
|
X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
|
|
crl = NULL;
|
|
dcrl = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
err:
|
|
X509_CRL_free(crl);
|
|
X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
|
|
return ok;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
|
|
|
|
static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
|
|
{
|
|
time_t *ptime;
|
|
int i;
|
|
if (notify)
|
|
ctx->current_crl = crl;
|
|
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
|
|
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
|
|
else
|
|
ptime = NULL;
|
|
|
|
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!notify)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
|
|
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!notify)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
|
|
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
|
|
{
|
|
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!notify)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
|
|
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
|
|
if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
|
|
{
|
|
if (!notify)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
|
|
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (notify)
|
|
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
|
|
X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
|
|
unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
|
|
X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
|
|
X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
|
|
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
|
|
reasons = *preasons;
|
|
crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
|
|
|
|
if (crl_score > best_score)
|
|
{
|
|
best_crl = crl;
|
|
best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
|
|
best_score = crl_score;
|
|
best_reasons = reasons;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (best_crl)
|
|
{
|
|
if (*pcrl)
|
|
X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
|
|
*pcrl = best_crl;
|
|
*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
|
|
*pscore = best_score;
|
|
*preasons = best_reasons;
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
|
|
if (*pdcrl)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
|
|
*pdcrl = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
|
|
* both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
|
|
{
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
|
|
int i;
|
|
i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
|
|
if (i >= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Can't have multiple occurrences */
|
|
if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
exta = NULL;
|
|
|
|
i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
|
|
|
|
if (i >= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
extb = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!exta && !extb)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!exta || !extb)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
|
|
|
|
static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Delta CRL must be a delta */
|
|
if (!delta->base_crl_number)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Base must have a CRL number */
|
|
if (!base->crl_number)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Issuer names must match */
|
|
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
|
|
X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* AKID and IDP must match */
|
|
if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
|
|
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
|
|
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
|
|
* or retrieve a chain of deltas...
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
|
|
X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_CRL *delta;
|
|
int i;
|
|
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
|
|
return;
|
|
if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
|
|
return;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
|
|
if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
|
|
{
|
|
if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
|
|
*pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
|
|
*dcrl = delta;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
*dcrl = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
|
|
* The return value is a mask of several criteria.
|
|
* If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
|
|
* The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
|
|
* no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
|
|
unsigned int *preasons,
|
|
X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int crl_score = 0;
|
|
unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
|
|
|
|
/* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
|
|
|
|
/* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
|
|
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
|
|
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
|
|
{
|
|
if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If no new reasons reject */
|
|
if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Don't process deltas at this stage */
|
|
else if (crl->base_crl_number)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
|
|
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
|
|
{
|
|
if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
|
|
|
|
if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
|
|
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
|
|
|
|
/* Check expiry */
|
|
if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
|
|
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
|
|
|
|
/* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
|
|
crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
|
|
|
|
/* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
|
|
|
|
if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
|
|
|
|
if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
|
|
{
|
|
/* If no new reasons reject */
|
|
if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
|
|
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*preasons = tmp_reasons;
|
|
|
|
return crl_score;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
|
|
X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
|
|
X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
|
|
int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
|
|
cidx++;
|
|
|
|
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
|
|
|
|
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
|
|
{
|
|
if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
|
|
{
|
|
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
|
|
*pissuer = crl_issuer;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
|
|
{
|
|
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
|
|
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
|
|
{
|
|
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
|
|
*pissuer = crl_issuer;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
|
|
|
|
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
|
|
* set of untrusted certificates.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
|
|
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
|
|
{
|
|
*pissuer = crl_issuer;
|
|
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
|
|
* X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
|
|
* parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
|
|
* will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
|
|
* practice.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
/* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
|
|
if (ctx->parent)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
|
|
/* Copy verify params across */
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
|
|
|
|
crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
|
|
crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
|
|
|
|
/* Verify CRL issuer */
|
|
ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* Check chain is acceptable */
|
|
|
|
ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
|
|
err:
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
|
|
* and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
|
|
* certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
|
|
* to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
|
|
* end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
|
|
* until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
|
|
cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
|
|
crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
|
|
if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
|
|
* 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
|
|
* 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
|
|
* 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
|
|
* 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
|
|
GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
|
|
GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
if (!a || !b)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
if (a->type == 1)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!a->dpname)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
|
|
if (b->type == 1)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!b->dpname)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
else
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
|
|
nm = a->dpname;
|
|
gens = b->name.fullname;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (b->type == 1)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!b->dpname)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
|
|
gens = a->name.fullname;
|
|
nm = b->dpname;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
|
|
if (nm)
|
|
{
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
|
|
if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
|
|
for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
|
|
{
|
|
genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
|
|
if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
|
|
/* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
|
|
if (!dp->CRLissuer)
|
|
return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
|
|
if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
|
|
|
|
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
|
|
unsigned int *preasons)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
|
|
{
|
|
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
*preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
|
|
if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
|
|
{
|
|
if (!crl->idp ||
|
|
idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
|
|
{
|
|
*preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
|
|
* If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
|
|
X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
int ok;
|
|
X509 *issuer = NULL;
|
|
int crl_score = 0;
|
|
unsigned int reasons;
|
|
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
|
|
X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
|
|
reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
|
|
ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
|
|
&issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
|
|
|
|
if (ok)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
/* Lookup CRLs from store */
|
|
|
|
skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
|
|
|
|
/* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
|
|
if (!skcrl && crl)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
/* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
|
|
if (crl)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
|
|
ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
|
|
ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
|
|
*pcrl = crl;
|
|
*pdcrl = dcrl;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check CRL validity */
|
|
static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *issuer = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
|
|
int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
|
|
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
|
|
chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
|
|
/* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
|
|
if (ctx->current_issuer)
|
|
issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
|
|
|
|
/* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
|
|
* is next certificate in chain.
|
|
*/
|
|
else if (cnum < chnum)
|
|
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
|
|
/* If not self signed, can't check signature */
|
|
if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if(!ok) goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(issuer)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
|
|
* been done
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!crl->base_crl_number)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
|
|
if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
|
|
!(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if(!ok) goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if(!ok) goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
|
|
{
|
|
if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if(!ok) goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if(!ok) goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
|
|
{
|
|
ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
|
|
ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
|
|
|
|
if(!ikey)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Verify CRL signature */
|
|
if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check certificate against CRL */
|
|
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
int ok;
|
|
X509_REVOKED *rev;
|
|
/* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
|
|
* unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
|
|
* a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
|
|
* critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if(!ok)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
|
|
* If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
|
|
{
|
|
if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
|
|
return 2;
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
if (ctx->parent)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
|
|
ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
|
|
if (ret == -1)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
|
|
* callback.
|
|
*/
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
int i;
|
|
for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
|
|
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
|
|
continue;
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
|
|
if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret == -2)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->current_cert = NULL;
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
|
|
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->current_cert = NULL;
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
|
|
if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
|
|
time_t *ptime;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
|
|
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
|
|
else
|
|
ptime = NULL;
|
|
|
|
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
|
|
ctx->current_cert=x;
|
|
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
|
|
ctx->current_cert=x;
|
|
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
|
|
ctx->current_cert=x;
|
|
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
|
|
ctx->current_cert=x;
|
|
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
int ok=0,n;
|
|
X509 *xs,*xi;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
|
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
|
|
|
|
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
|
|
|
|
n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
|
|
ctx->error_depth=n-1;
|
|
n--;
|
|
xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
|
|
xs=xi;
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (n <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
|
|
ctx->current_cert=xi;
|
|
ok=cb(0,ctx);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
n--;
|
|
ctx->error_depth=n;
|
|
xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
|
|
while (n >= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error_depth=n;
|
|
|
|
/* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
|
|
* explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
|
|
* just wastes time.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
|
|
{
|
|
if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
|
ctx->current_cert=xi;
|
|
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
|
|
ctx->current_cert=xs;
|
|
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
pkey=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
xs->valid = 1;
|
|
|
|
ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
|
|
ctx->current_issuer=xi;
|
|
ctx->current_cert=xs;
|
|
ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
n--;
|
|
if (n >= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
xi=xs;
|
|
xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ok=1;
|
|
end:
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
|
|
{
|
|
char *str;
|
|
ASN1_TIME atm;
|
|
long offset;
|
|
char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
|
|
int i,j;
|
|
|
|
p=buff1;
|
|
i=ctm->length;
|
|
str=(char *)ctm->data;
|
|
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
|
|
memcpy(p,str,10);
|
|
p+=10;
|
|
str+=10;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (i < 13) return 0;
|
|
memcpy(p,str,12);
|
|
p+=12;
|
|
str+=12;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
|
|
{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
*(p++)= *(str++);
|
|
*(p++)= *(str++);
|
|
/* Skip any fractional seconds... */
|
|
if (*str == '.')
|
|
{
|
|
str++;
|
|
while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
*(p++)='Z';
|
|
*(p++)='\0';
|
|
|
|
if (*str == 'Z')
|
|
offset=0;
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
|
|
offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
|
|
if (*str == '-')
|
|
offset= -offset;
|
|
}
|
|
atm.type=ctm->type;
|
|
atm.flags = 0;
|
|
atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
|
|
atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
|
|
|
|
if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
|
|
{
|
|
i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
|
|
if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
|
|
j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
|
|
if (j < 50) j+=100;
|
|
|
|
if (i < j) return -1;
|
|
if (i > j) return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
|
|
if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
else
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
|
|
int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
|
|
{
|
|
time_t t;
|
|
|
|
if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
|
|
else time(&t);
|
|
|
|
if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
|
|
return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
|
|
if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
|
|
return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
|
|
offset_sec);
|
|
}
|
|
return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
|
|
int i,j;
|
|
|
|
if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
|
|
if (ktmp == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
|
|
break;
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
|
|
ktmp=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (ktmp == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* first, populate the other certs */
|
|
for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
|
|
{
|
|
ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
|
|
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
|
|
{
|
|
/* This function is (usually) called only once, by
|
|
* SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
|
|
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
|
|
{
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->error=err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->error_depth;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->current_cert;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->chain;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
|
|
if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
|
}
|
|
return chain;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->current_issuer;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->current_crl;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->parent;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->cert=x;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->untrusted=sk;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->crls=sk;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
|
|
* values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
|
|
* own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
|
|
* the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
|
|
* purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
|
|
* An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
|
|
* purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
|
|
* aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
|
|
int purpose, int trust)
|
|
{
|
|
int idx;
|
|
/* If purpose not set use default */
|
|
if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
|
|
/* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
|
|
if (purpose)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
|
|
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
|
|
if (idx == -1)
|
|
{
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
|
|
X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
|
|
if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
|
|
{
|
|
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
|
|
if (idx == -1)
|
|
{
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
|
|
X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
|
|
}
|
|
/* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
|
|
if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
|
|
}
|
|
if (trust)
|
|
{
|
|
idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
|
|
if (idx == -1)
|
|
{
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
|
|
X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
|
|
if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
|
|
ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
|
|
if (!ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
|
|
return ctx;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
|
ctx->ctx=store;
|
|
ctx->current_method=0;
|
|
ctx->cert=x509;
|
|
ctx->untrusted=chain;
|
|
ctx->crls = NULL;
|
|
ctx->last_untrusted=0;
|
|
ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
|
|
ctx->valid=0;
|
|
ctx->chain=NULL;
|
|
ctx->error=0;
|
|
ctx->explicit_policy=0;
|
|
ctx->error_depth=0;
|
|
ctx->current_cert=NULL;
|
|
ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
|
|
ctx->current_crl=NULL;
|
|
ctx->current_crl_score=0;
|
|
ctx->current_reasons=0;
|
|
ctx->tree = NULL;
|
|
ctx->parent = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->param)
|
|
{
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
|
|
* use defaults.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (store)
|
|
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
|
|
|
|
if (store)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
|
|
ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->cleanup = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (store && store->check_issued)
|
|
ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
|
|
|
|
if (store && store->get_issuer)
|
|
ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
|
|
|
|
if (store && store->verify_cb)
|
|
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
|
|
|
|
if (store && store->verify)
|
|
ctx->verify = store->verify;
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->verify = internal_verify;
|
|
|
|
if (store && store->check_revocation)
|
|
ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
|
|
|
|
if (store && store->get_crl)
|
|
ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->get_crl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (store && store->check_crl)
|
|
ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
|
|
|
|
if (store && store->cert_crl)
|
|
ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
|
|
|
|
if (store && store->lookup_certs)
|
|
ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
|
|
|
|
if (store && store->lookup_crls)
|
|
ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
|
|
else
|
|
ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
|
|
|
|
ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
|
|
* X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
|
|
* corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
|
|
/* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
|
|
if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
|
|
&(ctx->ex_data)))
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
|
|
* This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->other_ctx = sk;
|
|
ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
|
|
if (ctx->param != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ctx->parent == NULL)
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
|
|
ctx->param=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->tree != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
|
|
ctx->tree=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->chain != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
|
|
ctx->chain=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
|
|
memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
|
|
int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->tree;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->explicit_policy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
|
|
param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
|
|
if (!param)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->param;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ctx->param)
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
|
|
ctx->param = param;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
|