mirror of
https://github.com/CloverHackyColor/CloverBootloader.git
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7c0aa811ec
Signed-off-by: Sergey Isakov <isakov-sl@bk.ru>
211 lines
8.8 KiB
C
211 lines
8.8 KiB
C
/** @file
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This driver produces Security2 and Security architectural protocol based on SecurityManagementLib.
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Copyright (c) 2006 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
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SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
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**/
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#include <Uefi.h>
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#include <Protocol/Security.h>
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#include <Protocol/Security2.h>
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#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
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#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
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#include <Library/UefiDriverEntryPoint.h>
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#include <Library/SecurityManagementLib.h>
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#include "Defer3rdPartyImageLoad.h"
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//
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// Handle for the Security Architectural Protocol instance produced by this driver
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//
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EFI_HANDLE mSecurityArchProtocolHandle = NULL;
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/**
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The EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL (SAP) is used to abstract platform-specific
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policy from the DXE core response to an attempt to use a file that returns a
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given status for the authentication check from the section extraction protocol.
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The possible responses in a given SAP implementation may include locking
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flash upon failure to authenticate, attestation logging for all signed drivers,
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and other exception operations. The File parameter allows for possible logging
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within the SAP of the driver.
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If File is NULL, then EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER is returned.
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If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by
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AuthenticationStatus is safe for the DXE Core to use, then EFI_SUCCESS is returned.
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If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by
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AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use under any circumstances,
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then EFI_ACCESS_DENIED is returned.
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If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by
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AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use right now, but it
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might be possible to use it at a future time, then EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is
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returned.
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@param This The EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL instance.
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@param AuthenticationStatus
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This is the authentication type returned from the Section
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Extraction protocol. See the Section Extraction Protocol
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Specification for details on this type.
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@param File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
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being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
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@retval EFI_SUCCESS Do nothing and return success.
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@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER File is NULL.
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**/
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EFI_STATUS
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EFIAPI
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SecurityStubAuthenticateState (
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IN CONST EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL *This,
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IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
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IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File
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)
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{
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EFI_STATUS Status;
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Status = ExecuteSecurity2Handlers (EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_AUTHENTICATION_STATE,
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AuthenticationStatus,
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File,
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NULL,
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0,
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FALSE
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);
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if (Status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
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Status = ExecuteSecurityHandlers (AuthenticationStatus, File);
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}
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return Status;
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}
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/**
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The DXE Foundation uses this service to measure and/or verify a UEFI image.
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This service abstracts the invocation of Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, UEFI
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Secure boot, and UEFI User Identity infrastructure. For the former two, the DXE Foundation
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invokes the FileAuthentication() with a DevicePath and corresponding image in
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FileBuffer memory. The TCG measurement code will record the FileBuffer contents into the
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appropriate PCR. The image verification logic will confirm the integrity and provenance of the
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image in FileBuffer of length FileSize . The origin of the image will be DevicePath in
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these cases.
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If the FileBuffer is NULL, the interface will determine if the DevicePath can be connected
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in order to support the User Identification policy.
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@param This The EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL instance.
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@param File A pointer to the device path of the file that is
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being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
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@param FileBuffer A pointer to the buffer with the UEFI file image.
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@param FileSize The size of the file.
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@param BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service. If
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FileAuthentication() is invoked not from the LoadImage(),
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BootPolicy must be set to FALSE.
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@retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL
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FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates
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that the DXE Foundation may use the file.
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@retval EFI_SUCCESS The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath
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and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform
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policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in
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FileBuffer.
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@retval EFI_SUCCESS FileBuffer is NULL and current user has permission to start
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UEFI device drivers on the device path specified by DevicePath.
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@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by DevicePath and FileBuffer did not
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authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the file should be
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placed in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file
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execution table.
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@retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not
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authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE
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Foundation many not use File.
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@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION FileBuffer is NULL and the user has no
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permission to start UEFI device drivers on the device path specified
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by DevicePath.
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@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION FileBuffer is not NULL and the user has no permission to load
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drivers from the device path specified by DevicePath. The
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image has been added into the list of the deferred images.
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**/
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EFI_STATUS
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EFIAPI
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Security2StubAuthenticate (
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IN CONST EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL *This,
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IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,
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IN VOID *FileBuffer,
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IN UINTN FileSize,
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IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
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)
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{
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EFI_STATUS Status;
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if (FileBuffer != NULL) {
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Status = Defer3rdPartyImageLoad (File, BootPolicy);
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if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
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return Status;
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}
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}
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return ExecuteSecurity2Handlers (EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE |
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EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_DEFER_IMAGE_LOAD |
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EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_MEASURE_IMAGE |
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EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_CONNECT_POLICY,
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0,
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File,
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FileBuffer,
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FileSize,
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BootPolicy
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);
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}
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//
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// Security2 and Security Architectural Protocol instance produced by this driver
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//
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EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL mSecurityStub = {
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SecurityStubAuthenticateState
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};
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EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL mSecurity2Stub = {
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Security2StubAuthenticate
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};
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/**
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Installs Security2 and Security Architectural Protocol.
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@param ImageHandle The image handle of this driver.
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@param SystemTable A pointer to the EFI System Table.
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@retval EFI_SUCCESS Install the sample Security Architectural Protocol successfully.
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**/
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EFI_STATUS
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EFIAPI
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SecurityStubInitialize (
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IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
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IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
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)
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{
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EFI_STATUS Status;
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//
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// Make sure the Security Architectural Protocol is not already installed in the system
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//
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ASSERT_PROTOCOL_ALREADY_INSTALLED (NULL, &gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid);
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ASSERT_PROTOCOL_ALREADY_INSTALLED (NULL, &gEfiSecurityArchProtocolGuid);
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//
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// Install the Security Architectural Protocol onto a new handle
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//
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Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
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&mSecurityArchProtocolHandle,
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&gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid,
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&mSecurity2Stub,
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&gEfiSecurityArchProtocolGuid,
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&mSecurityStub,
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NULL
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);
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ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
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Defer3rdPartyImageLoadInitialize ();
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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