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96 lines
4.2 KiB
C
96 lines
4.2 KiB
C
/** @file
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This file declares Pei Security2 PPI.
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This PPI is installed by some platform PEIM that abstracts the security
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policy to the PEI Foundation, namely the case of a PEIM's authentication
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state being returned during the PEI section extraction process.
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Copyright (c) 2006 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
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SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
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@par Revision Reference:
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This PPI is introduced in PI Version 1.0.
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**/
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#ifndef __SECURITY2_PPI_H__
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#define __SECURITY2_PPI_H__
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#define EFI_PEI_SECURITY2_PPI_GUID \
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{ 0xdcd0be23, 0x9586, 0x40f4, { 0xb6, 0x43, 0x6, 0x52, 0x2c, 0xed, 0x4e, 0xde } }
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typedef struct _EFI_PEI_SECURITY2_PPI EFI_PEI_SECURITY2_PPI;
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/**
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Allows the platform builder to implement a security policy
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in response to varying file authentication states.
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This service is published by some platform PEIM. The purpose of
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this service is to expose a given platform's policy-based
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response to the PEI Foundation. For example, if there is a PEIM
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in a GUIDed encapsulation section and the extraction of the PEI
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file section yields an authentication failure, there is no a
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priori policy in the PEI Foundation. Specifically, this
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situation leads to the question whether PEIMs that are either
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not in GUIDed sections or are in sections whose authentication
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fails should still be executed.
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@param PeiServices An indirect pointer to the PEI Services
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Table published by the PEI Foundation.
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@param This Interface pointer that implements the
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particular EFI_PEI_SECURITY2_PPI instance.
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@param AuthenticationStatus Authentication status of the file.
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xx00 Image was not signed.
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xxx1 Platform security policy override.
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Assumes same meaning as 0010 (the image was signed, the
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signature was tested, and the signature passed authentication test).
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0010 Image was signed, the signature was tested,
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and the signature passed authentication test.
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0110 Image was signed and the signature was not tested.
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1010 Image was signed, the signature was tested,
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and the signature failed the authentication test.
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@param FvHandle Handle of the volume in which the file
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resides. This allows different policies
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depending on different firmware volumes.
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@param FileHandle Handle of the file under review.
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@param DeferExecution Pointer to a variable that alerts the
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PEI Foundation to defer execution of a
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PEIM.
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@retval EFI_SUCCESS The service performed its action successfully.
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@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The object cannot be trusted.
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**/
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typedef
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EFI_STATUS
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(EFIAPI *EFI_PEI_SECURITY_AUTHENTICATION_STATE)(
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IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
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IN CONST EFI_PEI_SECURITY2_PPI *This,
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IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
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IN EFI_PEI_FV_HANDLE FvHandle,
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IN EFI_PEI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle,
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IN OUT BOOLEAN *DeferExecution
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);
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///
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/// This PPI is a means by which the platform builder can indicate
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/// a response to a PEIM's authentication state. This can be in
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/// the form of a requirement for the PEI Foundation to skip a
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/// module using the DeferExecution Boolean output in the
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/// AuthenticationState() member function. Alternately, the
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/// Security PPI can invoke something like a cryptographic PPI
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/// that hashes the PEIM contents to log attestations, for which
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/// the FileHandle parameter in AuthenticationState() will be
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/// useful. If this PPI does not exist, PEIMs will be considered
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/// trusted.
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///
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struct _EFI_PEI_SECURITY2_PPI {
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EFI_PEI_SECURITY_AUTHENTICATION_STATE AuthenticationState;
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};
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extern EFI_GUID gEfiPeiSecurity2PpiGuid;
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#endif
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