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CloverBootloader/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/providers/implementations/signature/dsa_sig.c

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/*
* Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* DSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/proverr.h>
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/sizes.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
#include "crypto/dsa.h"
#include "prov/der_dsa.h"
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn dsa_newctx;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn dsa_sign_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn dsa_verify_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn dsa_sign;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn dsa_verify;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn dsa_digest_sign_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn dsa_digest_signverify_update;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn dsa_digest_sign_final;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn dsa_digest_verify_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn dsa_digest_signverify_update;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn dsa_digest_verify_final;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn dsa_freectx;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn dsa_dupctx;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn dsa_get_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn dsa_gettable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_params_fn dsa_set_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn dsa_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_get_ctx_md_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_set_ctx_md_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
/*
* What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
* We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes DSA structures, so
* we use that here too.
*/
typedef struct {
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
char *propq;
DSA *dsa;
/*
* Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
* Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
* operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
* by their Final function.
*/
unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
/* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
unsigned char aid_buf[OSSL_MAX_ALGORITHM_ID_SIZE];
unsigned char *aid;
size_t aid_len;
/* main digest */
EVP_MD *md;
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
int operation;
} PROV_DSA_CTX;
static size_t dsa_get_md_size(const PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx)
{
if (pdsactx->md != NULL)
return EVP_MD_get_size(pdsactx->md);
return 0;
}
static void *dsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return NULL;
pdsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_DSA_CTX));
if (pdsactx == NULL)
return NULL;
pdsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx);
pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
if (propq != NULL && (pdsactx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(pdsactx);
pdsactx = NULL;
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
}
return pdsactx;
}
static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
const char *mdname, const char *mdprops)
{
if (mdprops == NULL)
mdprops = ctx->propq;
if (mdname != NULL) {
int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
WPACKET pkt;
EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
int md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(ctx->libctx, md,
sha1_allowed);
size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
if (md == NULL || md_nid < 0) {
if (md == NULL)
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
"%s could not be fetched", mdname);
if (md_nid < 0)
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
"digest=%s", mdname);
if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname))
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
"%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
EVP_MD_free(md);
return 0;
}
if (!ctx->flag_allow_md) {
if (ctx->mdname[0] != '\0' && !EVP_MD_is_a(md, ctx->mdname)) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
"digest %s != %s", mdname, ctx->mdname);
EVP_MD_free(md);
return 0;
}
EVP_MD_free(md);
return 1;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
/*
* We do not care about DER writing errors.
* All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
* AlgorithmIdentifier to be had, but the operation itself is
* still valid, just as long as it's not used to construct
* anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
*/
ctx->aid_len = 0;
if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
&& ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_DSA_with_MD(&pkt, -1, ctx->dsa,
md_nid)
&& WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
}
WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
ctx->mdctx = NULL;
ctx->md = md;
OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
}
return 1;
}
static int dsa_signverify_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa,
const OSSL_PARAM params[], int operation)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running()
|| pdsactx == NULL)
return 0;
if (vdsa == NULL && pdsactx->dsa == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NO_KEY_SET);
return 0;
}
if (vdsa != NULL) {
if (!ossl_dsa_check_key(pdsactx->libctx, vdsa,
operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if (!DSA_up_ref(vdsa))
return 0;
DSA_free(pdsactx->dsa);
pdsactx->dsa = vdsa;
}
pdsactx->operation = operation;
if (!dsa_set_ctx_params(pdsactx, params))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int dsa_sign_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
return dsa_signverify_init(vpdsactx, vdsa, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
}
static int dsa_verify_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa,
const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
return dsa_signverify_init(vpdsactx, vdsa, params, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
}
static int dsa_sign(void *vpdsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
int ret;
unsigned int sltmp;
size_t dsasize = DSA_size(pdsactx->dsa);
size_t mdsize = dsa_get_md_size(pdsactx);
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
if (sig == NULL) {
*siglen = dsasize;
return 1;
}
if (sigsize < (size_t)dsasize)
return 0;
if (mdsize != 0 && tbslen != mdsize)
return 0;
ret = ossl_dsa_sign_int(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, pdsactx->dsa);
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
*siglen = sltmp;
return 1;
}
static int dsa_verify(void *vpdsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
size_t mdsize = dsa_get_md_size(pdsactx);
if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || (mdsize != 0 && tbslen != mdsize))
return 0;
return DSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, pdsactx->dsa);
}
static int dsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname,
void *vdsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[],
int operation)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
if (!dsa_signverify_init(vpdsactx, vdsa, params, operation))
return 0;
if (!dsa_setup_md(pdsactx, mdname, NULL))
return 0;
pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
if (pdsactx->mdctx == NULL) {
pdsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
goto error;
}
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex2(pdsactx->mdctx, pdsactx->md, params))
goto error;
return 1;
error:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(pdsactx->mdctx);
pdsactx->mdctx = NULL;
return 0;
}
static int dsa_digest_sign_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname,
void *vdsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
return dsa_digest_signverify_init(vpdsactx, mdname, vdsa, params,
EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
}
static int dsa_digest_verify_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname,
void *vdsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
return dsa_digest_signverify_init(vpdsactx, mdname, vdsa, params,
EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
}
int dsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vpdsactx, const unsigned char *data,
size_t datalen)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
if (pdsactx == NULL || pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
return EVP_DigestUpdate(pdsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
}
int dsa_digest_sign_final(void *vpdsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
size_t sigsize)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dlen = 0;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || pdsactx == NULL || pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
* are ignored. Defer to dsa_sign.
*/
if (sig != NULL) {
/*
* There is the possibility that some externally provided
* digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
* but that problem is much larger than just in DSA.
*/
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(pdsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
return 0;
}
pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
return dsa_sign(vpdsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
}
int dsa_digest_verify_final(void *vpdsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
size_t siglen)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dlen = 0;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || pdsactx == NULL || pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* There is the possibility that some externally provided
* digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
* but that problem is much larger than just in DSA.
*/
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(pdsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
return 0;
pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
return dsa_verify(vpdsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
}
static void dsa_freectx(void *vpdsactx)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
ctx->propq = NULL;
ctx->mdctx = NULL;
ctx->md = NULL;
DSA_free(ctx->dsa);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
static void *dsa_dupctx(void *vpdsactx)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
PROV_DSA_CTX *dstctx;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return NULL;
dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
if (dstctx == NULL)
return NULL;
*dstctx = *srcctx;
dstctx->dsa = NULL;
dstctx->md = NULL;
dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
dstctx->propq = NULL;
if (srcctx->dsa != NULL && !DSA_up_ref(srcctx->dsa))
goto err;
dstctx->dsa = srcctx->dsa;
if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
goto err;
dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
|| !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
goto err;
}
if (srcctx->propq != NULL) {
dstctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(srcctx->propq);
if (dstctx->propq == NULL)
goto err;
}
return dstctx;
err:
dsa_freectx(dstctx);
return NULL;
}
static int dsa_get_ctx_params(void *vpdsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
OSSL_PARAM *p;
if (pdsactx == NULL)
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
if (p != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, pdsactx->aid, pdsactx->aid_len))
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, pdsactx->mdname))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
static int dsa_set_ctx_params(void *vpdsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
if (pdsactx == NULL)
return 0;
if (params == NULL)
return 1;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
if (p != NULL) {
char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
return 0;
if (propsp != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
return 0;
if (!dsa_setup_md(pdsactx, mdname, mdprops))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM settable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
static const OSSL_PARAM settable_ctx_params_no_digest[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_settable_ctx_params(void *vpdsactx,
ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
if (pdsactx != NULL && !pdsactx->flag_allow_md)
return settable_ctx_params_no_digest;
return settable_ctx_params;
}
static int dsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vpdsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
if (pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(pdsactx->mdctx, params);
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vpdsactx)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
if (pdsactx->md == NULL)
return 0;
return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(pdsactx->md);
}
static int dsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vpdsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
if (pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(pdsactx->mdctx, params);
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vpdsactx)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
if (pdsactx->md == NULL)
return 0;
return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(pdsactx->md);
}
const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_dsa_signature_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))dsa_newctx },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_sign_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))dsa_sign },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_verify_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))dsa_verify },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_sign_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_update },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_sign_final },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_verify_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_update },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_verify_final },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))dsa_freectx },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))dsa_dupctx },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))dsa_get_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void (*)(void))dsa_gettable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))dsa_set_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void (*)(void))dsa_settable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
(void (*)(void))dsa_get_ctx_md_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
(void (*)(void))dsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
(void (*)(void))dsa_set_ctx_md_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
(void (*)(void))dsa_settable_ctx_md_params },
{ 0, NULL }
};
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