CloverBootloader/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c

335 lines
12 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 2007-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "cmp_local.h"
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/cmp.h>
#include <openssl/crmf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
/*
* This function is also used by the internal verify_PBMAC() in cmp_vfy.c.
*
* Calculate protection for given PKImessage according to
* the algorithm and parameters in the message header's protectionAlg
* using the credentials, library context, and property criteria in the ctx.
*
* returns ASN1_BIT_STRING representing the protection on success, else NULL
*/
ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
ASN1_BIT_STRING *prot = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
const void *ppval = NULL;
int pptype = 0;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
return NULL;
/* construct data to be signed */
prot_part.header = msg->header;
prot_part.body = msg->body;
if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
return NULL;
}
X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, &pptype, &ppval, msg->header->protectionAlg);
if (OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) {
int len;
size_t prot_part_der_len;
unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
size_t sig_len;
unsigned char *protection = NULL;
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
const unsigned char *pbm_str_uc = NULL;
if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PBM_SECRET);
return NULL;
}
if (ppval == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
return NULL;
}
len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
goto end;
}
prot_part_der_len = (size_t)len;
pbm_str = (ASN1_STRING *)ppval;
pbm_str_uc = pbm_str->data;
pbm = d2i_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(NULL, &pbm_str_uc, pbm_str->length);
if (pbm == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
goto end;
}
if (!OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq,
pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len,
ctx->secretValue->data, ctx->secretValue->length,
&protection, &sig_len))
goto end;
if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
goto end;
/* OpenSSL defaults all bit strings to be encoded as ASN.1 NamedBitList */
prot->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
prot->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(prot, protection, sig_len)) {
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
prot = NULL;
}
end:
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
OPENSSL_free(protection);
OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
return prot;
} else {
int md_nid;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
if (ctx->pkey == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP,
CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
return NULL;
}
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID), &md_nid, NULL)
|| (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
return NULL;
}
if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (ASN1_item_sign_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART), NULL,
NULL, prot, &prot_part, NULL, ctx->pkey, md,
ctx->libctx, ctx->propq))
return prot;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
return NULL;
}
}
/* ctx is not const just because ctx->chain may get adapted */
int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
return 0;
/* Add first ctx->cert and its chain if using signature-based protection */
if (!ctx->unprotectedSend && ctx->secretValue == NULL
&& ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
int prepend = X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
| X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS;
/* if not yet done try to build chain using available untrusted certs */
if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
"trying to build chain for own CMP signer cert");
ctx->chain = X509_build_chain(ctx->cert, ctx->untrusted, NULL, 0,
ctx->libctx, ctx->propq);
if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
"success building chain for own CMP signer cert");
} else {
/* dump errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
"could not build chain for own CMP signer cert");
}
}
if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&msg->extraCerts, ctx->chain, prepend))
return 0;
} else {
/* make sure that at least our own signer cert is included first */
if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&msg->extraCerts, ctx->cert, prepend))
return 0;
ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "fallback: adding just own CMP signer cert");
}
}
/* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut */
if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&msg->extraCerts, ctx->extraCertsOut,
X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP))
return 0;
/* in case extraCerts are empty list avoid empty ASN.1 sequence */
if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) == 0) {
sk_X509_free(msg->extraCerts);
msg->extraCerts = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Create an X509_ALGOR structure for PasswordBasedMAC protection based on
* the pbm settings in the context
*/
static int set_pbmac_algor(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR **alg)
{
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
unsigned char *pbm_der = NULL;
int pbm_der_len;
ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
return 0;
pbm = OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->pbm_slen,
EVP_MD_get_type(ctx->pbm_owf), ctx->pbm_itercnt,
ctx->pbm_mac);
pbm_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
if (pbm == NULL || pbm_str == NULL)
goto err;
if ((pbm_der_len = i2d_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(pbm, &pbm_der)) < 0)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(pbm_str, pbm_der, pbm_der_len))
goto err;
if (*alg == NULL && (*alg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
X509_ALGOR_set0(*alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC),
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str);
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
return 1;
err:
ASN1_STRING_free(pbm_str);
OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
return 0;
}
static int set_sig_algor(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR **alg)
{
int nid = 0;
ASN1_OBJECT *algo = NULL;
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&nid, EVP_MD_get_type(ctx->digest),
EVP_PKEY_get_id(ctx->pkey))) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE);
return 0;
}
if ((algo = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL)
return 0;
if (*alg == NULL && (*alg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
if (X509_ALGOR_set0(*alg, algo, V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL))
return 1;
ASN1_OBJECT_free(algo);
return 0;
}
static int set_senderKID(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *id)
{
if (id == NULL)
id = ctx->referenceValue; /* standard for PBM, fallback for sig-based */
return id == NULL || ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header, id);
}
/* ctx is not const just because ctx->chain may get adapted */
int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
return 0;
/*
* For the case of re-protection remove pre-existing protection.
*/
X509_ALGOR_free(msg->header->protectionAlg);
msg->header->protectionAlg = NULL;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(msg->protection);
msg->protection = NULL;
if (ctx->unprotectedSend) {
if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, NULL))
goto err;
} else if (ctx->secretValue != NULL) {
/* use PasswordBasedMac according to 5.1.3.1 if secretValue is given */
if (!set_pbmac_algor(ctx, &msg->header->protectionAlg))
goto err;
if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, NULL))
goto err;
/*
* will add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut
* while not needed to validate the protection certificate,
* the option to do this might be handy for certain use cases
*/
} else if (ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
/* use MSG_SIG_ALG according to 5.1.3.3 if client cert and key given */
/* make sure that key and certificate match */
if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert, ctx->pkey)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!set_sig_algor(ctx, &msg->header->protectionAlg))
goto err;
/* set senderKID to keyIdentifier of the cert according to 5.1.1 */
if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, X509_get0_subject_key_id(ctx->cert)))
goto err;
/*
* will add ctx->cert followed, if possible, by its chain built
* from ctx->untrusted, and then ctx->extraCertsOut
*/
} else {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP,
CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
goto err;
}
if (!ctx->unprotectedSend
&& ((msg->protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL))
goto err;
/*
* For signature-based protection add ctx->cert followed by its chain.
* Finally add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut;
* even if not needed to validate the protection
* the option to do this might be handy for certain use cases.
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
goto err;
/*
* As required by RFC 4210 section 5.1.1., if the sender name is not known
* to the client it set to NULL-DN. In this case for identification at least
* the senderKID must be set, where we took the referenceValue as fallback.
*/
if (!(ossl_cmp_general_name_is_NULL_DN(msg->header->sender)
&& msg->header->senderKID == NULL))
return 1;
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION);
err:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}