mirror of
https://github.com/CloverHackyColor/CloverBootloader.git
synced 2024-12-04 13:23:26 +01:00
397 lines
11 KiB
C
397 lines
11 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CT
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# error "CT disabled"
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#endif
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#include <openssl/ct.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/tls1.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include "ct_local.h"
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SCT *SCT_new(void)
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{
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SCT *sct = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sct));
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if (sct == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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sct->entry_type = CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET;
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sct->version = SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET;
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return sct;
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}
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void SCT_free(SCT *sct)
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{
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if (sct == NULL)
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return;
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OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
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OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
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OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
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OPENSSL_free(sct->sct);
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OPENSSL_free(sct);
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}
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void SCT_LIST_free(STACK_OF(SCT) *a)
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{
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sk_SCT_pop_free(a, SCT_free);
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}
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int SCT_set_version(SCT *sct, sct_version_t version)
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{
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if (version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
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return 0;
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}
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sct->version = version;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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return 1;
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}
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int SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type)
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{
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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switch (entry_type) {
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case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509:
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case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT:
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sct->entry_type = entry_type;
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return 1;
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case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_NOT_SET:
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break;
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}
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, CT_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENTRY_TYPE);
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return 0;
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}
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int SCT_set0_log_id(SCT *sct, unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len)
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{
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if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
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sct->log_id = log_id;
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sct->log_id_len = log_id_len;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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return 1;
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}
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int SCT_set1_log_id(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *log_id, size_t log_id_len)
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{
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if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1 && log_id_len != CT_V1_HASHLEN) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
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sct->log_id = NULL;
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sct->log_id_len = 0;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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if (log_id != NULL && log_id_len > 0) {
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sct->log_id = OPENSSL_memdup(log_id, log_id_len);
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if (sct->log_id == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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sct->log_id_len = log_id_len;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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void SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp)
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{
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sct->timestamp = timestamp;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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}
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int SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid)
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{
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switch (nid) {
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case NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
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sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256;
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sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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return 1;
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case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256:
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sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256;
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sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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return 1;
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default:
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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void SCT_set0_extensions(SCT *sct, unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
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sct->ext = ext;
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sct->ext_len = ext_len;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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}
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int SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
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sct->ext = NULL;
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sct->ext_len = 0;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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if (ext != NULL && ext_len > 0) {
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sct->ext = OPENSSL_memdup(ext, ext_len);
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if (sct->ext == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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sct->ext_len = ext_len;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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void SCT_set0_signature(SCT *sct, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
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sct->sig = sig;
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sct->sig_len = sig_len;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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}
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int SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
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sct->sig = NULL;
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sct->sig_len = 0;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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if (sig != NULL && sig_len > 0) {
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sct->sig = OPENSSL_memdup(sig, sig_len);
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if (sct->sig == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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sct->sig_len = sig_len;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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sct_version_t SCT_get_version(const SCT *sct)
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{
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return sct->version;
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}
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ct_log_entry_type_t SCT_get_log_entry_type(const SCT *sct)
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{
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return sct->entry_type;
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}
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size_t SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id)
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{
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*log_id = sct->log_id;
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return sct->log_id_len;
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}
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uint64_t SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct)
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{
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return sct->timestamp;
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}
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int SCT_get_signature_nid(const SCT *sct)
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{
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if (sct->version == SCT_VERSION_V1) {
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if (sct->hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
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switch (sct->sig_alg) {
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case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
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return NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
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case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
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return NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption;
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default:
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return NID_undef;
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}
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}
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}
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return NID_undef;
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}
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size_t SCT_get0_extensions(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **ext)
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{
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*ext = sct->ext;
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return sct->ext_len;
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}
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size_t SCT_get0_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **sig)
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{
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*sig = sct->sig;
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return sct->sig_len;
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}
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int SCT_is_complete(const SCT *sct)
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{
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switch (sct->version) {
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case SCT_VERSION_NOT_SET:
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return 0;
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case SCT_VERSION_V1:
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return sct->log_id != NULL && SCT_signature_is_complete(sct);
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default:
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return sct->sct != NULL; /* Just need cached encoding */
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}
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}
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int SCT_signature_is_complete(const SCT *sct)
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{
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return SCT_get_signature_nid(sct) != NID_undef &&
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sct->sig != NULL && sct->sig_len > 0;
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}
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sct_source_t SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct)
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{
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return sct->source;
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}
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int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source)
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{
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sct->source = source;
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
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switch (source) {
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case SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION:
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case SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE:
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return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509);
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case SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION:
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return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT);
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case SCT_SOURCE_UNKNOWN:
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break;
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}
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/* if we aren't sure, leave the log entry type alone */
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return 1;
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}
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sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct)
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{
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return sct->validation_status;
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}
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int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
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{
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int is_sct_valid = -1;
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SCT_CTX *sctx = NULL;
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X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL;
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const CTLOG *log;
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/*
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* With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means,
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* let alone validate one. So we return validation failure (0).
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*/
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if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION;
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return 0;
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}
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log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store,
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sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len);
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/* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */
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if (log == NULL) {
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG;
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return 0;
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}
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sctx = SCT_CTX_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq);
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if (sctx == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(log)) != 1)
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goto err;
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if (SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(sctx, log_pkey) != 1)
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goto err;
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if (SCT_get_log_entry_type(sct) == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT) {
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EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey;
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if (ctx->issuer == NULL) {
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
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goto end;
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}
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issuer_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(ctx->issuer);
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if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&pub, issuer_pkey) != 1)
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goto err;
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if (SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(sctx, pub) != 1)
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goto err;
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}
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SCT_CTX_set_time(sctx, ctx->epoch_time_in_ms);
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/*
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* XXX: Potential for optimization. This repeats some idempotent heavy
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* lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not
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* use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is
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* processed. So it may make more sense to do this just once, perhaps
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* associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx.
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*
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* XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an
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* issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of
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* memory condition. When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just
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* mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the
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* validation status. That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT
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* processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal
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* errors. Since the function does not distinguish between certificate
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* issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing
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* to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or
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* application decide what to do.
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*/
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if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1)
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sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
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else
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sct->validation_status = SCT_CTX_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ?
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SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID;
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end:
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is_sct_valid = sct->validation_status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID;
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err:
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X509_PUBKEY_free(pub);
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X509_PUBKEY_free(log_pkey);
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SCT_CTX_free(sctx);
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return is_sct_valid;
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}
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int SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
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{
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int are_scts_valid = 1;
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int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0;
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) {
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int is_sct_valid = -1;
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SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i);
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if (sct == NULL)
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continue;
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is_sct_valid = SCT_validate(sct, ctx);
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if (is_sct_valid < 0)
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return is_sct_valid;
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are_scts_valid &= is_sct_valid;
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}
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return are_scts_valid;
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}
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