mirror of
https://github.com/CloverHackyColor/CloverBootloader.git
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210 lines
6.5 KiB
C
210 lines
6.5 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2021-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/params.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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/*
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* This is a demonstration of how to compute Poly1305-AES using the OpenSSL
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* Poly1305 and AES providers and the EVP API.
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*
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* Please note that:
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*
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* - Poly1305 must never be used alone and must be used in conjunction with
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* another primitive which processes the input nonce to be secure;
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*
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* - you must never pass a nonce to the Poly1305 primitive directly;
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*
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* - Poly1305 exhibits catastrophic failure (that is, can be broken) if a
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* nonce is ever reused for a given key.
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*
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* If you are looking for a general purpose MAC, you should consider using a
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* different MAC and looking at one of the other examples, unless you have a
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* good familiarity with the details and caveats of Poly1305.
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*
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* This example uses AES, as described in the original paper, "The Poly1305-AES
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* message authentication code":
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* https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf
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*
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* The test vectors below are from that paper.
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*/
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/*
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* Hard coding the key into an application is very bad.
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* It is done here solely for educational purposes.
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* These are the "r" and "k" inputs to Poly1305-AES.
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*/
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static const unsigned char test_r[] = {
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0x85, 0x1f, 0xc4, 0x0c, 0x34, 0x67, 0xac, 0x0b,
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0xe0, 0x5c, 0xc2, 0x04, 0x04, 0xf3, 0xf7, 0x00
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};
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static const unsigned char test_k[] = {
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0xec, 0x07, 0x4c, 0x83, 0x55, 0x80, 0x74, 0x17,
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0x01, 0x42, 0x5b, 0x62, 0x32, 0x35, 0xad, 0xd6
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};
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/*
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* Hard coding a nonce must not be done under any circumstances and is done here
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* purely for demonstration purposes. Please note that Poly1305 exhibits
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* catastrophic failure (that is, can be broken) if a nonce is ever reused for a
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* given key.
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*/
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static const unsigned char test_n[] = {
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0xfb, 0x44, 0x73, 0x50, 0xc4, 0xe8, 0x68, 0xc5,
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0x2a, 0xc3, 0x27, 0x5c, 0xf9, 0xd4, 0x32, 0x7e
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};
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/* Input message. */
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static const unsigned char test_m[] = {
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0xf3, 0xf6
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};
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static const unsigned char expected_output[] = {
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0xf4, 0xc6, 0x33, 0xc3, 0x04, 0x4f, 0xc1, 0x45,
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0xf8, 0x4f, 0x33, 0x5c, 0xb8, 0x19, 0x53, 0xde
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};
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/*
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* A property query used for selecting the POLY1305 implementation.
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*/
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static char *propq = NULL;
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int main(int argc, char **argv)
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{
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int rv = EXIT_FAILURE;
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EVP_CIPHER *aes = NULL;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *aesctx = NULL;
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EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
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EVP_MAC_CTX *mctx = NULL;
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unsigned char composite_key[32];
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unsigned char out[16];
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OSSL_LIB_CTX *library_context = NULL;
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size_t out_len = 0;
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int aes_len = 0;
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library_context = OSSL_LIB_CTX_new();
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if (library_context == NULL) {
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fprintf(stderr, "OSSL_LIB_CTX_new() returned NULL\n");
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goto end;
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}
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/* Fetch the Poly1305 implementation */
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mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(library_context, "POLY1305", propq);
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if (mac == NULL) {
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fprintf(stderr, "EVP_MAC_fetch() returned NULL\n");
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goto end;
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}
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/* Create a context for the Poly1305 operation */
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mctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac);
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if (mctx == NULL) {
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fprintf(stderr, "EVP_MAC_CTX_new() returned NULL\n");
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goto end;
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}
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/* Fetch the AES implementation */
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aes = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(library_context, "AES-128-ECB", propq);
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if (aes == NULL) {
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fprintf(stderr, "EVP_CIPHER_fetch() returned NULL\n");
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goto end;
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}
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/* Create a context for AES */
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aesctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
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if (aesctx == NULL) {
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fprintf(stderr, "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() returned NULL\n");
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goto end;
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}
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/* Initialize the AES cipher with the 128-bit key k */
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if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(aesctx, aes, NULL, test_k, NULL)) {
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fprintf(stderr, "EVP_EncryptInit_ex() failed\n");
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goto end;
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}
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/*
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* Disable padding for the AES cipher. We do not strictly need to do this as
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* we are encrypting a single block and thus there are no alignment or
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* padding concerns, but this ensures that the operation below fails if
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* padding would be required for some reason, which in this circumstance
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* would indicate an implementation bug.
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*/
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if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(aesctx, 0)) {
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fprintf(stderr, "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() failed\n");
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goto end;
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}
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/*
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* Computes the value AES_k(n) which we need for our Poly1305-AES
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* computation below.
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*/
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if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(aesctx, composite_key + 16, &aes_len,
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test_n, sizeof(test_n))) {
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fprintf(stderr, "EVP_EncryptUpdate() failed\n");
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goto end;
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}
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/*
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* The Poly1305 provider expects the key r to be passed as the first 16
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* bytes of the "key" and the processed nonce (that is, AES_k(n)) to be
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* passed as the second 16 bytes of the "key". We already put the processed
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* nonce in the correct place above, so copy r into place.
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*/
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memcpy(composite_key, test_r, 16);
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/* Initialise the Poly1305 operation */
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if (!EVP_MAC_init(mctx, composite_key, sizeof(composite_key), NULL)) {
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fprintf(stderr, "EVP_MAC_init() failed\n");
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goto end;
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}
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/* Make one or more calls to process the data to be authenticated */
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if (!EVP_MAC_update(mctx, test_m, sizeof(test_m))) {
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fprintf(stderr, "EVP_MAC_update() failed\n");
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goto end;
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}
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/* Make one call to the final to get the MAC */
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if (!EVP_MAC_final(mctx, out, &out_len, sizeof(out))) {
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fprintf(stderr, "EVP_MAC_final() failed\n");
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goto end;
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}
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printf("Generated MAC:\n");
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BIO_dump_indent_fp(stdout, out, out_len, 2);
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putchar('\n');
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if (out_len != sizeof(expected_output)) {
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fprintf(stderr, "Generated MAC has an unexpected length\n");
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goto end;
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}
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if (CRYPTO_memcmp(expected_output, out, sizeof(expected_output)) != 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "Generated MAC does not match expected value\n");
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goto end;
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}
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rv = EXIT_SUCCESS;
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end:
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(aesctx);
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EVP_CIPHER_free(aes);
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EVP_MAC_CTX_free(mctx);
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EVP_MAC_free(mac);
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OSSL_LIB_CTX_free(library_context);
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if (rv != EXIT_SUCCESS)
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ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
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return rv;
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}
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