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protect mac comparisons from timing attacks
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@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ angular
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if (key.macKey && encPieces.length > 2) {
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var macBytes = forge.util.decode64(encPieces[2]);
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var computedMacBytes = computeMac(ctBytes, ivBytes, key.macKey, false);
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if (!bytesAreEqual(macBytes, computedMacBytes)) {
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if (!macsEqual(key.macKey, macBytes, computedMacBytes)) {
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console.error('MAC failed.');
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return null;
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}
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@ -431,18 +431,20 @@ angular
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return b64Output ? forge.util.encode64(mac.getBytes()) : mac.getBytes();
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}
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// Constant time comparison. This removes the early-out optimizations of normal equality checks.
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function bytesAreEqual(a, b) {
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if (a.length !== b.length) {
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return false;
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}
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// Safely compare two MACs in a way that protects against timing attacks.
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// ref: https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2011/february/double-hmac-verification/
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function macsEqual(macKey, mac1, mac2) {
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var hmac = forge.hmac.create();
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var result = 0;
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for (var i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
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result |= a[i] ^ b[i];
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}
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hmac.start('sha256', macKey);
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hmac.update(mac1);
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mac1 = hmac.digest().getBytes();
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return result === 0;
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hmac.start(null, null);
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hmac.update(mac2);
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mac2 = hmac.digest().getBytes();
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return mac1 === mac2;
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}
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function SymmetricCryptoKey(keyBytes, b64KeyBytes, encType) {
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